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Abstract
Background: Independent treatment centres (ITCs) are a growing phenomenon in many healthcare systems. Focus 
factory theory predicts that ITCs provide high quality healthcare with low prices, through specialisation, high-volume 
and routine. This study examines if ITC care outperforms general hospital (GH) care within a regulated competition 
system in the Netherlands, by focusing on differences in healthcare quality and price. 
Methods: The cross-sectional study combined publicly available quality data, list prices and insurer contracts for 2017. 
Clinical outcomes of 5 elective surgeries (total hip and knee replacement, anterior cruciate ligament (ACL), cataract and 
carpal tunnel surgeries) were compared using zero-or-one inflated beta-regressions, corrected for underlying structural 
factors (ie, volume of care, process and structure indicators, and chain affiliation). Furthermore, price differences between 
ITCs and GHs were examined using ordinary least squares regressions. Lastly, we analysed quality of care in relation to 
the number of insurance contracts of the 4 largest Dutch insurance companies using ordered logistic regressions. 
Results: Quality differences between ITCs and GHs were found to be inconsistent across procedures. No facility type 
performed better overall. There were no differences exhibited in the list prices between ITCs and GHs. No consistent 
relationship was found between the underlying factors and quality or price, in different procedures and time. We found 
no indication for selective contracting based on quality within the ITC sector.
Conclusions: This study found no evidence that ITCs outperform GHs on quality or price. This evidence does not 
support the focus factory theory. The substantial practice variation in quality of care may justify more evidence-based 
contracting within the market for elective surgery. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Based on the results of this study, independent treatment centres (ITCs) do not seem to deliver higher quality of care compared to general 
hospitals (GHs). Therefore, it seems to be undesirable to actively reallocate care from GHs to ITCs, solely based on quality arguments. 
• No significant relationship between list prices and type of provider (ie, ITCs and GHs) was found. This could have implications for patients with 
a restricted healthcare provider plan and those who choose a non-contracted healthcare provider. 
• Contracting is not related to quality within the ITC sector. The substantial practice variation in quality of care may justify more evidence-based 
contracting within both the ITC and the GH markets. 
Implications for the public
Our study found considerable variation in terms of quality outcomes and prices between healthcare facilities – both general hospitals (GHs) and 
independent treatment centres (ITCs). Patients should take quality and list price variations into account when they have a restricted provider plan, 
and when choosing a suitable healthcare provider. However, this study concluded that these patients do not need to prefer ITCs over GHs in terms 
of quality or price.
Key Messages 
¶Both authors contributed 
equally to this paper.
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Background 
Healthcare systems worldwide strive to improve the quality 
of care, while experiencing a growing need to curb the 
increasing healthcare costs.1 As a response, governments aim 
to improve quality and reduce costs simultaneously.2,3 One 
of the proposed solutions is the reallocation of ambulatory 
care from general hospitals (GHs) to independent treatment 
centres (ITCs).4,5
ITCs are a growing phenomenon in many healthcare 
systems. In the United Kingdom, the number of ITCs grew 
from 10 in 2006-2007 to 161 ITCs in 2010-2011.6,7 In the 
Netherlands, the number of ITCs increased by 87%, from 
229 ITC sites in 2009 to 418 ITC sites in 2016, while the 
number of invasive treatments performed in ITCs nearly 
tripled.8 Yet, the share of ITCs within total reimbursable 
healthcare in the Netherlands is only 3.8% in 2016.9 The 
expansion of ITCs may be explained by increased possibilities 
to perform more invasive procedures in outpatient settings, 
as a result of technological developments.10 Due to the 
increasing significance of ITC care, it is important to study 
cost- and quality differences between ITC care and GH care, 
and investigate how this is supported within a regulated 
competition healthcare system. 
The Dutch healthcare system regulates ITCs and GHs to a 
great extent. Healthcare providers that provide reimbursable 
medical care are not allowed to allocate profits to third parties. 
Hence, ITCs offering reimbursable care are non-profit entities, 
as are hospitals. The classification of ITCs as a distinct type of 
healthcare provider was formalised in 1998, when ITCs were 
allowed to provide reimbursable medical care for a limited 
array of treatments. The rationale behind the legislation was 
to reduce waiting lists and to control for-profit clinics.11,12 
In 2005, a formal distinction between ITCs and hospitals 
was abolished with the introduction of the Health Care 
Institutions Admission Act. This act classifies hospitals and 
ITCs equally as medical specialist care providers. However, 
in practice, ITCs differ significantly from hospitals in their 
organisational set-up: ITCs are much smaller, offer primarily 
elective ambulatory care, and tend to be more focused.13 In 
practice, ITCs are still categorised differently by various 
stakeholders in the Dutch healthcare system. 
The Dutch healthcare system was reformed in 2006. 
Since then, consumers have been able to freely choose their 
health insurers and healthcare providers.14,15 In this regulated 
competition system, health insurers purchase healthcare 
selectively from different providers, and negotiate features, 
such as volume, price and quality. Insurers offer 2 types 
of plans: a benefits in-kind plan and a restitution plan.16 A 
restitution plan reimburses all providers, guaranteeing full 
choice for consumers (± 20% of the population). A benefits 
in-kind plan offers full reimbursement to a restricted network 
of providers, and partial reimbursement (usually 75%) to out-
of-network providers.17 
Patients seeking care at ITCs are likely to differ from 
those visiting GHs.13 For example, patients have different 
pre-requisites or preferences in choosing between GHs and 
ITCs. The location and presence of certain physicians are 
important factors in patients’ choice of GHs, whereas quality 
of care and limited waiting time are important motivations 
for patients opting for ITCs.18 Important information sources 
for patients choosing an ITC include advice from friends and 
acquaintances (47%), and the internet (42%). Information for 
choice of GH is often gained from previous experiences (57%) 
or advice from a general practitioner or physician (30%).18 
Theory
ITCs often specialise in a specific set of elective low-invasive 
medical procedures.11 Their concept originates from the 
‘focus factory’ theory, which builds on specialisation – with 
the intention to yield benefits from simplicity, repetition, 
experience and homogeneity of performances. This theory 
implies increased productivity and quality improvements as a 
result of focus.13,19 Thus, the focus and narrow scope of ITCs 
might lead to better performances, compared to GHs.
Healthcare performance could be driven by a number of 
underlying factors related to the focus factory theory. The 
focus of ITCs could be reflected in improved performance 
on process and structure indicators, due to standardisation 
and improved coordination of processes.20 This might also 
reduce overhead costs, leading to lower production costs 
and potentially lower prices. Moreover, high volume could 
improve quality – known as the volume-quality relationship.21 
Furthermore, chain membership (ie, facilities with multiple 
sites) could improve quality through the benefits of greater 
resources and organisational knowledge from other chain 
members.
Selective contracting of efficient and effective care by 
health insurers could be an important driver to improve 
quality within the ITC sector. Almost every hospital in the 
Netherlands is contracted by the main insurance companies, 
but this is not the case for ITCs.22 ITCs might, therefore, feel 
inclined to profile themselves as a provider of high quality care 
with low prices, to compete with hospitals that have greater 
market power. Representatives of the ITC sector deemed 
this pressure as very high, as they experience difficulties in 
obtaining contracts from health insurers.22
The aim of this study is to compare ITCs to GHs on quality 
of care and price. The main research questions are: Do 
quality outcomes differ between ITCs and GHs? Do prices 
differ between ITCs and GHs? Furthermore, 2 supporting 
research questions were asked towards understanding the 
determinants behind potential performance differences. 
(i) Which underlying factors are associated with quality 
outcomes or prices? (ii) Is selective contracting within the 
ITC sector based on quality outcomes of the previous year?
Methods
Data and Variables
Quality data of Dutch hospitals and ITCs for 2017 was 
extracted from the public dataset of the Dutch National 
Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland). Five medical 
procedures were selected based on the availability of clinical 
outcome data: anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) surgery, 
cataract surgery, total hip replacement (THR), total knee 
replacement (TKR), and carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) 
surgery. We collected (1) clinical outcomes, (2) process and 
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structure indicators, and (3) the annual number of surgeries 
per facility. The quality indicators were selected and defined 
by various stakeholders (eg, the respective medical specialist 
associations); the Dutch National Health Care Institute 
and the Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa) facilitated and 
managed this process. Percentage postoperative infections 
after CTS and the percentage of revisions after TKR, THR, 
and ACL surgery were used as clinical outcomes. The quality 
indicators for CTS, TKR, THR, and ACL were negatively 
framed (which means that high quality was represented by 
a percentage close to zero). Postoperative improved visual 
acuity (ie, ≥1 line improved on eye chart) and comparisons 
between achieved refraction and target refraction were 
used as clinical outcome measures for cataract surgery, and 
were positively framed (which means that high quality was 
represented by a percentage close to 100). Patients with ocular 
comorbidities were excluded from the quality dataset for 
cataract surgery. THR or TKR revision percentages were case-
mix adjusted (ie, gender, age, ASA classification, diagnosis, 
body mass index, Charnley classification and smoking) by the 
Dutch Arthroplasty Register.23-25 For CTS and ACL surgery, 
no data on case-mix was available.
An index measure was made upon the various process and 
structure indicators for each individual medical procedure. 
For example, if a facility uses a decision aid, the process 
measure will be 1 (good performance). If a facility does 
not comply to this standard, the process measure will be 0 
(poor performance). The dichotomous quality indicators 
(see Supplementary file 1, Table S1) were transformed into 
z-scores.26,27 Index measures were based upon the mean of the 
z-scores of the individual quality indicators. No index was 
constructed for ACL treatments due to the absence of process 
and structure indicators. 
To collect price data, we first selected the most frequently 
used surgical diagnostic related groups ([DRGs] referred to as 
DOTs in Dutch) per treatment. In the Netherlands, prices are 
freely negotiable: each insurer and provider negotiate a DRG-
price for contracted care. As these prices are competition-
sensitive, they are not made public, and were not available for 
this study. However, providers are legally obliged to publish 
list prices. In theory, these prices apply for patients without 
health insurance or patients who receive care from a non-
contracted provider. When patients visit out-of-network-
providers, they may pay up to 25% of the list price, out-
of-pocket. Therefore, list prices may be used as a proxy for 
contracted prices, although list prices are generally higher 
than contracted prices. List prices of the first quarter of 2017 
were obtained by manually searching websites and directly 
contacting healthcare providers during December 2018. 
A dichotomous variable for chain affiliation was constructed 
manually. Providers with at least 2 sites (ie, different unique 
addresses) were categorised as chains. In order to also include 
outpatient hospital clinics, a dataset from the Dutch Ministry 
of Health, Welfare of Sport was used.28
Data on whether or not insurance companies contracted 
ITCs for the 5 medical procedures were obtained by hand-
searching the websites of the 4 largest insurance companies 
(CZ, Zilveren Kruis, VGZ, and Menzis, which together 
covered 88.4% of the Dutch insurance market in 201729) in 
December 2018. The list of providers that were contracted 
in each limited provider plan was used to construct the total 
number of contracts per ITC. 
Before the analysis was performed, this study imposed 
several restrictions to the data. We had to exclude healthcare 
providers that did not provide annual quality data. These 
consist of: 4 ITC observations and 1 GH observation for 
cataract surgery; 4 ITC observations and 1 GH observation 
for CTS; 4 ITC observations for THR and TKR; and 4 ITC 
observations and 2 GH observations for ACL. Furthermore, 
5 facilities were not able to deliver list prices for 2017, and 
were excluded from the price analyses. We excluded specialty 
and academic hospitals from all analyses, because they tend 
to treat a different and more complex patient group compared 
to ITCs and GHs.30 In addition, specialty and academic 
hospitals have teaching obligations that could affect quality 
and price. This assumption was relaxed in the robustness 
analyses. We also excluded providers that delivered data as 
holding companies only. This means that we had to remove 
those providers that provided the same care at multiple sites, 
but the different sites did not report their individual data. 
This resulted in the exclusion of 1 ITC chain that provided 
care for all 5 medical procedures included in this study. To 
identify observations with a potentially great influence on the 
regression coefficients, we performed Cook’s distance tests on 
all regression models.31 Since our sample size was relatively 
small and single infections could lead to high infection 
percentages in providers with low volumes; our results could 
have been driven by outliers. A Cook’s distance value >0.85 
was required for an observation to be considered influential.32 
This resulted in exclusion from the regression analysis. One 
TKR observation and one ACL observation were identified 
as highly influential. Furthermore, ordinal logistic regression 
was only performed with sufficient sample size (n > 10), 
therefore, no models on insurance contracts were conducted 
on THR (n = 9) and TKR (n = 10). 
Data Analysis
For each medical procedure, 5 regressions were run; 3 models 
with quality as a dependent variable, one with list price as a 
dependent variable and one with the number of insurance 
contracts as a dependent variable. In all regression models, 
standard errors were clustered on chain affiliation level. 
Firstly, we tested for differences in clinical outcomes 
between ITCs and GHs (Table S2 Model 1a). Secondly, 
we checked which underlying factors might drive clinical 
outcomes (ie, volume, process and structure measures, and 
chain affiliation) (Table S2 Model 1b). Thirdly, we combined 
these 2 models to assess if the relationship between the type 
of provider and clinical outcomes persists when controlling 
for underlying factors (Model 1). As the outcome measures 
are bounded by 0% and 100%, with a significant portion 
of the observations at the extremes, zero-or-one inflated 
beta regressions were used.33,34 In these models, coefficients 
should be interpreted as elasticities. The marginal effects 
were calculated separately through the margins command 
in Stata 15® and reported in the text. Fourthly, an ordinary 
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least squares model was applied to identify differences in list 
price between ITCs and GHs, while correcting for underlying 
factors (volume, process and structure measures, and chain 
affiliation) (Model 2). (In Figure S1, we display the residual 
plots to assess if the residuals after the ordinary least squares 
regressions are normally distributed. Please note that we had 
already clustered our observations within chains to limit this 
possibility. These plots illustrate that no irregular variances 
of residuals can be detected.) Fifthly, by means of an ordered 
logistic regression, the number of contracted ITCs in 2018 
was related to quality (ie, clinical outcomes) in the previous 
year (Model 3). We used an ordered logistic regression, as the 
dependent variable – number of contracts – should be treated 
as ordered categorical classes. 
We performed several robustness checks. Firstly, we 
repeated the analyses with quality data from 2016. No quality 
data of previous years could be used, as different quality 
indicators were used prior to 2016. Secondly, we estimated 
if the exclusion of specialist and academic hospitals had a 
significant impact on the result. Thirdly, we checked if results 
changed when outliers were included (ie, 1 TKR observations 
and 1 ACL observation).
Results 
Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are given in Table 1. Quality differences 
are small and inconsistent; ITCs outperform GHs on cataract 
care, CTS and ACL surgery, but perform on average worse 
on THR and TKR. However, standard errors are often large, 
indicating high variation in quality outcomes in both ITCs 
and GHs. All procedures except ACL surgery are performed 
on average more frequently in GHs. The majority of ITCs are 
affiliated to a chain (50%-62%), with chain affiliation rates 
being especially high for ITCs performing TKR and THR 
(respectively 60% and 62%). Most GHs are affiliated to a 
chain (ie, having at least 2 sites – including outpatient clinics) 
as well (55%-57%). GHs perform better on process and 
structure indicators (Table S1), as illustrated by the average 
index measure being negative for ITCs and positive for GHs. 
Average list prices are higher in ITCs for TKR, THR and 
CTS surgeries, but lower for cataract and ACL surgeries. The 
variance in surgery list prices on TKR and THR is larger within 
ITCs. Furthermore, the vast majority of GHs are contracted 
by the 4 largest insurance companies (on average 3.91-3.96). 
The ITCs are contracted substantially less and with greater 
variance (on average 2.60-3.44). All GHs have insurance 
contracts with at least one of the 4 insurance companies, 
which is not the case for all ITCs.
Regression Analyses
No clear quality differences were found between ITCs and 
GHs for TKR, cataract and CTS surgeries (Table 2 and Table 
S2). Model 1a (Table S2) estimates that ITCs have a higher 
revision rate for THR, but a lower revision rate for ACL. 
Both relationships persist when correcting for underlying 
factors (Table 2). The estimated elasticity of 0.82 for THR 
translates into a 1.44 percentage point higher revision rate in 
ITCs. ITCs performed 2.21 percentage point fewer revision 
surgeries than GHs for ACL. Table 2 indicates that the chance 
of developing postoperative infections declines when more 
CTS surgeries are performed. However, a volume-quality 
relationship was not found for any of the other procedures. 
Similarly, the process and structure indicators are only related 
to one procedure: they are positively associated with the 
increase of postoperative dioptre of target for cataract care. 
Chain affiliation seems unrelated to quality. 
Price and Facility Type
The association between list prices and facility type is shown 
in Table 3. No differences in list prices were found between 
ITCs and GHs after correction for additional factors. High 
volume is related to a lower list price for standard cataract 
surgery, although the effect is limited: each additional surgery 
lowers the list price by approximately €0.05. Furthermore, 
good performances on process and structure measures are 
related to higher surgery prices for CTS surgery. This means 
that one standard-deviation increase in process and structure 
indicators increases list prices by €121.
Insurance Contracts
No relationship was detected between the number of insurance 
contracts for 2018 and quality data of ITCs in 2017 (Table 4). 
This suggests that insurance contracts are independent of 
quality of care within the ITC sector.
Robustness Checks
Robustness checks are displayed in Tables S3 to S7. Diverging 
from the 2017 results, no statistically significant differences 
in quality between ITCs and GHs were found in 2016 (Table 
S4, Model 1). Fewer revisions after THR occurred in 2016 
compared to 2017, especially for ITCs (Table 1 and Table 
S3). The corrected zero-or-one inflated models show that the 
inferior performance of ITCs on THR compared to GHs in 
2017 (Table 2), was not found in 2016 (Table S4, Model 1). 
Also, the significant relationship between ACL and type of 
facility disappeared in 2016 (Table S4, Model 1). Furthermore, 
our findings from 2017 indicate a volume-quality relationship 
for CTS, but this relationship disappeared in 2016; and, vice 
versa, no volume-quality relationship was found for TKR in 
2017 (Table 2), but there was such a relationship in 2016 (Table 
S4, Model 1). In addition, the process and structure indicators 
are still associated with better performance on cataract care, 
but in 2016, the process and structure indicators are related to 
the other cataract quality measure (ie, postoperative improved 
visual acuity) instead of the postoperative dioptre of target. 
These findings reaffirm that no robust quality differences 
could be detected between ITCs and GHs.
When speciality and academic hospitals are included, the 
corrected quality outcomes change slightly in favour of ITCs 
(Table S5). For example, in contrast to Table 2, ITCs perform 
significantly better than general, specialty and academic 
hospitals on postoperative dioptre of target refraction after 
cataract surgery. One of the explanations for this disparity is 
that academic hospitals treat a different patient-base when 
performing cataract surgery.30 This might suggest that the 
exclusion of ocular comorbidity does not fully correct for 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 2017
Cataract CTS TKR THR ACL
ITC GH ITC GH ITC GH ITC GH ITC GH
Quality Indicators 
Postoperative ≤1 dioptre of 
target refraction [%]
94.87 ± 3.32 
(30)
93.78 ± 3.45 
(64)
Postoperative improved visual 
acuity ≥1 line [%]
85.58 ± 9.81
(30)
83.10 ± 7.25 
(64)
Postoperative infection within 30 
days [%]
0.15 ± 0.31 
(20)
0.28 ± 0.46 
(69)
Revision within 1 year [%] 2.72 ± 3.29 (10)
1.28 ± 0.89 
(69)
1.93 ± 2.06 
(9)
1.69 ± 1.06 
(69)
2.92 ± 5.73 
(14)
3.75 ± 2.75 
(66)
Process and structure measurea 
[index]
-0.12 ± 0.38 
(32)
0.08 ± 0.35 
(65)
-0.13 ± 0.64 
(24)
0.05 ± 0.39 
(70) -0.68 ± 0.55 (15)




0.13 ± 0.57 
(69)
Volume Indicators 







163.07 ± 182.84 
(15)
315.00 ± 149.90 
(69)
127.92 ± 130.68 
(13)






Chain affiliation [dummy] 0.50 ± 0.51 (32)
0.57 ± 0.50 
(65)
0.50 ± 0.51 
(24)
0.56 ± 0.50 
(70)
0.60 ± 0.51 
(15)




0.55 ± 0.50 
(69)
0.56 ± 0.51 
(18)
0.56 ± 0.50 
(68)
Prices and Contracts
Insurance contracts [n] 3.44 ± 1.11 (32)
3.94 ± 0.24 
(64)
2.96 ± 1.27 
(24)
3.91 ± 0.28 
(69)
2.60 ± 1.55 
(15)
3.96 ± 0.21 
(68)
2.62 ± 1.61 
(13)
3.96 ± 0.21 
(68)
2.94 ± 1.35 
(18)
3.94 ± 0.30 
(67)

















4243.23 ± 726.79 
(67)
Abbreviations: GH, general hospital; ITC, independent treatment centre; THR, total hip replacement; TKR, total knee replacement; CTS, carpal tunnel syndrome; ACL, anterior cruciate ligament.
Values are presented as mean ± standard error (n).
a See Table S1 for overview.
b The following DRG codes were used: Cataract surgery - 070401008; CTS - 990004071; TKR - 131999104; THR - 131999052; ACL – 131999102.
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case-mix differences between the different types of providers. 
Furthermore, the significant relationship between the 
probability of having revisions within one year after THR 
and type of provider disappears. This implies that academic 
hospitals (this analysis does not include specialty hospitals) 
have similar quality performances as ITCs. Hence, it seems 
to be that particularly GHs performed well on this measure 
in 2017. To conclude, facility type remained unrelated to 
price differences after inclusion of speciality- and academic 
hospitals (Table S6).
The final robustness check, which includes the outliers 
with Cook’s Distance values above 0.85, illustrates that the 2 
outliers have a substantial impact on the results (Table S7). 
ITCs become associated with a higher chance of revisions for 
TKR, while in the main model (Table 2), we did not find such 
a relationship. In addition, the relationship between facility 
type and ACL care disappeared in the model when the outlier 
was included. 
Discussion 
This study compared ITCs with GHs on quality and price, 
and expected ITCs to provide better quality at a lower price – 
based on the focus factory theory. However, quality differences 
were inconsistent over different medical procedures and over 
time. ITCs needed fewer revision surgeries after ACL surgery. 
In contrast, revision surgery after THR was performed more 
Table 2. Zero-or-One Inflated Beta Regression Models on Quality in Relation to Facility Type (ie, ITC Versus GH) 2017
Dependent Variable 
Cataracta CTS TKR THR ACL
Postoperative ≤1 
Dioptre of Target [0-1]
Improved Visual 
Acuity ≥1 line [0-1]
Postoperative 
Infection [0-1]
Revision Within 1 
Year [0-1]
Revision Within 1 
Year [0-1]
Revision Within 1 
Year [0-1]
Model 1 n = 94 n = 94 n = 89 n = 78 n = 78 n = 79
GH Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
ITC 0.20 ± 0.14 0.09 ± 0.14 -0.08 ± 0.17 0.62 ± 0.45 0.82***± 0.20 -0.69**± 0.29
No. of surgeries (x100) -0.00 ± 0.01 -0.00 ± 0.01 -0.14** ± 0.07 -0.07 ± 0.04 -0.02 ± 0.04 0.04 ± 0.11
Process/structure 0.49** ± 0.23 -0.13 ± 0.25 -0.26 ± 0.14 0.02 ± 0.17 0.10 ± 0.11
No chain affiliation Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Chain affiliation -0.08 ± 0.12 -0.25 ± 0.16  0.34 ± 0.18 0.10 ± 0.16 0.09 ± 0.13 -0.08 ± 0.20
Abbreviations: GH, general hospital; ITC, independent treatment centre; THR, total hip replacement; TKR, total knee replacement; CTS, carpal tunnel syndrome; 
ACL, anterior cruciate ligament.
Values are presented as coefficient ± clustered standard error.
a The dependent variables of the cataract models are positively framed (one-inflated beta regressions), where the others are negatively framed (zero-or-one 
inflated beta regressions).
*** P < .01, ** P < .05.
Table 3. Relation Price and Facility Type (ie, ITC Versus GH) 2017
Dependent Variable 
Cataract CTS TKR THR ACL
List Price Surgery [€] List Price Surgery [€] List Price Surgery [€] List Price Surgery [€] List Price Surgery [€]
Model 2 n = 94 n = 87 n = 82 n = 80 n = 81
GH Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
ITC -49.15 ± 41.61 51.62 ± 56.59 203.98 ± 519.83 460.97 ± 465.21 -2.98 ± 160.13
No. of surgeries (x100) -5.23*** ± 1.94 -0.68 ± 10.58 -73.19 ± 0.73 -44.36 ± 55.59 62.07 ± -50.95
Process/structure -31.89 ± 47.95 120.70** ± 57.01 -15.31 ± 208.29 35.18 ± 132.54
No chain affiliation Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Chain affiliation -6.23 ± 44.37 -22.88 ± 45.17 30.89 ± 258.90 97.83 ± 253.74 60.16 ± 175.05
Abbreviations: GH, general hospital; ITC, independent treatment centre; THR, total hip replacement; TKR, total knee replacement; CTS, carpal tunnel syndrome; 
ACL, anterior cruciate ligament.
Values are presented as coefficient ± clustered standard error.
*** P < .01, ** P < .05.
Table 4. Four Ordered Logistic Regression Models on the Relation Between Insurance Contracts of ITCs Concluded in 2018 and Quality in 2017
Number of Insurance Contracts [0-4]
 Model 3
Cataract model – fraction ≤1 dioptre of target refraction 10.17 ± 13.06 (30)
Cataract model – fraction improved visual acuity ≥1 line 1.65 ± 3.33 (30)
CTS model – fraction infection -97.44 ± 98.48 (20)
ACL injury model – fraction revision 82.05 ± 65.11 (14)
Abbreviations: ITCs, independent treatment centres; CTS, carpal tunnel syndrome; ACL, anterior cruciate ligament.
Values are presented as coefficient ± clustered standard error (n).
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often in ITCs than in GHs. However, these differences did 
not persist when we performed the robustness checks. No 
significant relationship was found between lists prices and 
facility type (ie, ITCs and GHs). This is relevant for patients 
with a restrictive-provider plan, as they may need to pay 
the difference between the list price and 75% of the mean 
contracted price when they decide to visit a non-contracted 
provider.17 Furthermore, the underlying factors did not 
demonstrate a clear relationship with quality or price over the 
different medical procedures. This indicates that ITCs may 
not strategically compete for patients by offering lower prices 
or better clinical outcomes.
These empirical findings are in line with international 
empirical literature, which illustrated inconsistent quality 
differences between ITCs and hospitals.30,35-38 Recent evidence 
from the Netherlands identified quality differences between 
ITCs and GHs in providing cataract care.30 This study found 
that ITCs scored significantly higher on patient satisfaction 
compared to GHs, but patient reported outcomes were 
similar.30 Empirical evidence from England points towards 
better clinical outcomes after THR and TKR in ITCs 
compared to NHS providers. However, differences were small 
and the authors did not fully adjust for case-mix differences.35 
Browne et al found slightly better outcomes in patients 
treated in ITCs, but the authors state that ‘such differences 
were minor and unlikely to be clinically significant.’36 In 
the United States, Chukmaitov et al found no difference in 
quality of ambulatory surgery centres and hospitals,38 while 
Hollingsworth et al found fewer complications after urological 
surgery for ambulatory surgery centres.39 The inconsistent 
findings on clinical quality outcomes could be caused by 
ITCs that focus more on aspects such as patients’ experiences 
and satisfaction.40,41 In line with research on hospital chain 
affiliation in the United States, our study found no indications 
that chain affiliation improves quality of care.42 
We found no overall differences in list prices between ITCs 
and GHs. The Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa) found 
approximately 10%-15% lower contracted prices across the 
board for ITCs compared to GHs,11 and another, more recent 
empirical study finds that ITCs offer 8% lower contracted 
prices than GHs for cataract care.30 A lower contracted price 
could indicate that ITCs have less bargaining power vis-à-vis 
insurers. This reasoning is supported by existing literature, 
which found lower profit margins for ITCs compared to 
GHs.43 Alternatively, lower contracted prices could reflect 
ITCs being more efficient. However, hospitals may be equally 
efficient, but may use higher margins on procedures that can 
be standardised easily to cross-subsidize more loss-making 
procedures. This requires additional research.
Similar to the quality outcome measures, the volume-
quality relationship and the relationship between quality 
and the process and structure indicators vary over time. We 
found that facilities with more CTS surgeries scored better on 
clinical outcomes (ie, less postoperative infections) in 2017, 
but not in 2016. In contrast, there was a significant volume-
quality relationship for THR in 2016, but this relationship was 
not detected in 2017. Furthermore, we did not find a volume-
quality relationship for the other treatments. The volume-
quality relationship has been demonstrated in previous 
research on high-risk surgical procedures in hospitals,44-49 but 
is less studied for low-risk surgical outpatient procedures.50,51 
Previous research has demonstrated that high-volume 
hospitals provided better quality of care for low-risk invasive 
treatments.50,52-54 One contribution from the United States and 
the Netherlands shows that the volume-quality relationship 
also persist within the ITC sector, however, this relationship 
appears to be weaker.51,55 Different from the previous studies, 
our results do not indicate that a volume-quality relationship 
exists for the 5 treatments included in this study.
Lastly, we did not find convincing evidence that healthcare 
insurers selectively contract ITCs based on quality. Therefore, 
ITCs may not obtain a competitive advantage when 
outperforming on quality. This goes against the premise of the 
regulated competition system that high quality gets rewarded 
through selective contracting. Studies on the relation between 
quality and selective contracting in the managed competition 
sector in the Netherlands are limited, and show mixed 
results.56-58 Studies on price competition in the Dutch hospital-
sector also show limited responsiveness of insurers to price 
differences.14,15,59 One study found an increase in total costs 
of inpatient DRGs after the introduction of market-based 
price competition, but a decrease in total costs of outpatient 
DRGs.14 Heijink et al detected no decrease in cataract prices 
after the introduction of regulated competition, and insurers 
did not selectively contract hospitals on cataract care.15 The 
role of quality in negotiations between insurers and providers 
seems to be limited.59 
Limitations
Despite the uniqueness of the quality dataset – which contains 
quality data of both GHs and ITCs for multiple treatments 
– some data limitations need to be taken into account when 
interpreting our results. Firstly, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of unobserved confounders, such as remaining 
case-mix differences. The models that include specialty and 
academic hospitals indicate concerns of such sort. International 
evidence allude to concerns of ‘cherry-picking’ behaviour 
among ITCs, which means that ITCs treat less complex 
patients compared to GHs.60,61 However, some studies indicate 
that these case-mix differences are not that pronounced.30,62 
We could not control for case-mix when assessing CTS and 
ACL surgeries. Case-mix could potentially drive quality 
outcomes for CTS treatments.63 For instance, ITCs might 
treat less CTS patients with diabetes compared to GHs,64 but 
differences in postoperative infections between diabetic and 
non-diabetic patients are not necessarily present.65 One risk 
factor for postoperative complications for ACL surgery is if 
the patient needs inpatient admission following ACL surgery 
(ie, overnight stays).66,67 This is highly influenced by the type 
of anaesthesia; regional anaesthesia provides more same-day 
discharges, while general anaesthesia often requires inpatient 
admission.68,69 It is unclear if the choice of anaesthesia between 
ITCs and GHs significantly differs – most ITCs and GHs offer 
both options (ie, same-day and overnight stay). Insufficient 
case-mix correction could lead to unjustifiable lower quality 
in hospitals due to more highly-complex surgeries. Even if 
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case-mix differences bias our outcome results towards higher 
quality for ITCs as a result of ‘cherry-picking,’ the absence 
of quality differences indicates that remaining case-mix 
differences may play a limited role, or that absence of quality 
differences is a conservative conclusion. 
Secondly, despite a legal mandate for providers to report 
their annual quality data to the Dutch National Health Care 
Institute, some providers did not report their quality data. 
This could introduce selection bias. Also, one large ITC 
chain aggregated location-specific outcomes, and had to be 
excluded. We checked if the observations regarding quality 
and price of this ITC chain were significantly different from 
the other observations. We found that these observations 
were less than one z-score removed from the overall mean. 
Therefore, we argue that the possibility that the exclusion 
of this chain will bias our results is limited. To check the 
completeness of the data, we compared ITCs included in our 
dataset to all healthcare providers featured on the website of 
the Dutch Patients Association (ZorgkaartNederland.nl): a 
tool for patients to choose between healthcare providers. The 
vast majority of ITCs were present in our dataset – depending 
on the type of treatment – ranging from 74% to 97%. This 
indicates that our data covers most of the ITC market, but 
selection bias could not be ruled out. Again, this suggests 
that the absence of higher quality in ITCs is a conservative 
conclusion. 
Thirdly, list prices might not reflect real prices, as contracted 
prices are generally lower than list prices, especially for ITCs. 
Furthermore, it is unclear if list prices are actually used to 
inform out-of-network patients. For example, legislation 
prevents prices of out-of-network care to form a major 
barrier in patient choice: for patients visiting out-of-network 
providers at least 75% of the average contracted market 
price must be compensated by insurers. If 75% of the mean 
market price would be sufficient to cover marginal costs, out-
of-network patients may not be charged any out-of-pocket 
costs, and the list prices lose their informational value. More 
research is needed to assess if and how list prices are actually 
used in practice. 
Other limitations include self-reporting, small sample size 
and ITC physicians working in GHs. Firstly, quality data was 
self-reported by ITCs and GHs, which could result in positive 
misreporting (ie, desirable answers). Secondly, our findings 
are based on a relatively small sample size, which limit the 
ability to detect small differences. In addition, results from 
small sample sizes are more susceptible to outliers. This was 
also demonstrated in the robustness checks. Thirdly, a report 
from 2013 states that at least 96 ITC physicians (divided over 
a total of 313 ITCs) also worked as a physician at a GH.18 
However, the available data did not allow us to correct for 
physicians that work in both GHs and ITCs. These physicians 
could transfer knowledge and experience between GHs and 
ITCs, reducing quality differences between facilities types. 
Implications
Our study contributes to the understanding of how ITCs 
perform compared to GHs on quality of care, price, and how 
effective selective contracting is, with regard to quality of care, 
within the Dutch ITC sector. The ITC sector has become 
more prominent in many healthcare systems and the need for 
ambulatory care is likely to grow in the near future, with an 
increasingly ageing population that will further intensify the 
demand on, for instance, ophthalmological and orthopaedic 
care.70,71 
Despite its limitations, our findings could be of interest 
to various stakeholders. Firstly, health insurers may want 
to utilise this information in strategic contracting. We 
found that ITCs are less often contracted than GHs. From 
a quality perspective, ITCs do not seem to outperform 
GHs. Furthermore, while we found no differences in list 
prices, other studies have shown that contracted prices were 
lower for ITCs compared to GHs.11,30 Thus, reallocating 
low invasive care to ITCs could still be attractive for health 
insurers from a cost perspective. Although ITCs and GHs 
on average perform similarly, substantial practice variation 
in quality may justify more selective contracting on quality. 
This could also incentivise both ITCs and GHs to invest in 
quality. Creating more transparency in healthcare costs and 
prices is warranted in order to study the economic effects of 
ITCs. Additionally, transparency could empower patients to 
make better-informed decisions and lower healthcare costs by 
creating a more efficient and competitive system.72 Enhancing 
and improving open data in healthcare systems to monitor 
the performance of different types of providers has the 
potential to greatly improve the efficiency of the healthcare 
system. Only with better case-mix adjustments can we assess 
if specialty and academic hospitals are value-adding entities, 
and if it is more efficient for some patients to be treated in 
GHs and/or ITCs. Once those improvements are realised, the 
ITC sector has the potential to play a more prominent role in 
the provision of elective care and can potentially contribute 
to the financial sustainability of the Dutch healthcare system.
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